Money laundering frequently depends on the separation of visible legal ownership from effective economic control. Shell companies and benami arrangements can facilitate that separation, yet neither the existence of a thinly capitalised company nor every third-party property holding establishes criminality. This doctrinal paper examines how opaque corporate structures, nominee ownership, layered payments and concealed beneficial interests may be employed to disguise proceeds of crime. It analyses the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, company-law disclosure obligations and international beneficial-ownership standards. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between predicate criminality, laundering, benami property and legitimate commercial structuring; evidentiary reconstruction of ownership and control; enforcement coordination; and procedural fairness. The paper argues that an effective response requires verifiable beneficial-ownership information, transaction-level financial intelligence, proportionate scrutiny and careful judicial separation of suspicion from proof. It proposes integrated but legally bounded information sharing, stronger verification of nominee relationships, targeted professional due diligence and improved tracing of cross-border corporate layers.